Quick Take
- What: llama.cpp v1.0.0 blocks server-side request forgery through the CORS proxy and media URLs, and requires API keys for tools or MCP on non-loopback addresses
- Who is affected: llama-server builds before v1.0.0, especially machines that also browse the web or servers bound to 0.0.0.0 with tools enabled and no API key
- What to do: Update to llama.cpp v1.0.0; set an API key if tools or MCP are enabled on a non-loopback address; enable CORS on local MCP servers if the CORS proxy was used to reach them
- Fixed in: v1.0.0, released November 13, 2026
- Found by: Xuan-Son Nguyen, llama.cpp maintainer
In plain English
The llama.cpp project released version 1.0.0 with security fixes for its llama-server component. Before this version, a visited web page could use the server’s CORS proxy to reach internal network addresses, which is called server-side request forgery. The new version also refuses to start the server with tools or MCP enabled on a network address unless you set an API key.
What you should do: If you run llama-server on your personal computer or on a network, you should update to v1.0.0. If you don’t use llama.cpp or llama-server, you can ignore this.
What happened
The llama.cpp project released v1.0.0 on November 13, 2026 with a group of server security changes. Maintainer Xuan-Son Nguyen wrote and merged the two main pull requests, 32113 and 32115, on November 12, 2026. Neither change carries a CVE.
The CORS proxy and the media URLs accepted in chat completion input could previously resolve to any address, including loopback and LAN hosts, which is server-side request forgery. Version 1.0.0 refuses private targets unless the operator passes --media-allow-private-urls. A reviewer reported that both a redirect to 127.0.0.1 and a DNS rebinding host were blocked.
Separately, starting the server with tools or MCP enabled on a non-loopback address and no API key is now refused. CORS origin matching now checks the port as well as the host.
Nguyen writes that the original design assumed operators would sandbox llama-server, while many now run it on personal computers.
Who is affected
Builds before v1.0.0 are exposed on any machine that also browses the web, because a visited page can drive the CORS proxy at internal addresses. Anyone who bound the server to 0.0.0.0 with tools enabled and no key was serving those tools to the network.
What you should do
Update to llama.cpp v1.0.0. If start-up now fails because tools or MCP are enabled on a non-loopback address, set an API key rather than passing --allow-unauthenticated-tools. Anything that relied on the CORS proxy to reach a localhost or LAN MCP server needs CORS enabled on that server instead.



