Quick Take
- What: CVE-2026-115563, an OAuth credential disclosure flaw in the Model Context Protocol Python SDK.
- Who is affected: HTTP clients using
ClientCredentialsOAuthProvider,PrivateKeyJWTOAuthProvider,OAuthClientProvider, or the deprecatedRFC7523OAuthClientProviderfrom version 1.9.1 until the fixed releases 1.30.0 and 2.2.0. - What to do: Upgrade to 1.30.0 (1.x) or 2.2.0 (2.x) now. Pass the
issuer=parameter when constructing OAuth providers to bind credentials to a specific authorization server. - Not affected: MCP servers, stdio clients, and clients that attach their own tokens or headers are not vulnerable.
- Severity: High (CVSS 7.5).
In plain English
A security flaw in the Model Context Protocol Python SDK allowed OAuth credentials (client secrets, authorization codes, or signed assertions) to be sent to the wrong authorization server. This happened because the SDK did not properly check which server should receive the credentials, so an untrusted MCP server could trick the client into sending its credentials to an attacker-controlled server.
What you should do: If you use the MCP Python SDK with OAuth for HTTP clients, you should upgrade to the fixed version right away. If you only use MCP servers or stdio clients, you are not affected and can ignore this issue.
What happened
The Model Context Protocol Python SDK from version 1.9.1 up to the fixed releases 1.30.0 (1.x line) and 2.2.0 (2.x line) contained a vulnerability in its OAuth client support. The affected OAuth providers (ClientCredentialsOAuthProvider, PrivateKeyJWTOAuthProvider, OAuthClientProvider, and the deprecated RFC7523OAuthClientProvider) could not properly identify which authorization server owned their credentials.
As a result, an untrusted MCP server could direct the client to send sensitive OAuth credentials to an authorization server of the attacker’s choosing. The credentials at risk included client secrets, authorization codes, PKCE code verifiers, and signed client assertions.
The vulnerability was addressed in pull requests #3398, #3431, and #3435. The fixes validate the authorization server metadata issuer on every discovery path, ensuring that credentials are only sent to the correct authorization server. The SDK now checks the metadata’s issuer field against the expected authorization server URL, as required by RFC 8414 section 3.3.
What you should do
Upgrade to Model Context Protocol Python SDK version 1.30.0 or 2.2.0. When constructing ClientCredentialsOAuthProvider or PrivateKeyJWTOAuthProvider, pass the issuer= parameter naming the authorization server that issued your credentials. This binds the credentials to that specific server and prevents them from being sent elsewhere.
Constructing these providers without the issuer= parameter is now deprecated and will be required in version 3.0.
What it means
This vulnerability allowed an attacker controlling an MCP server to steal OAuth credentials from clients. The impact is high because OAuth credentials grant access to protected resources and can be reused by attackers. Organizations using the affected SDK versions for HTTP-based MCP clients should audit their deployments and rotate any credentials that may have been exposed.
The fix ensures that OAuth clients only send credentials to the authorization server that issued them, preventing credential theft through malicious or compromised MCP servers.
Malicious MCP servers stealing OAuth tokens from clients is a pattern across SDKs: see the token theft flaw in the mcp-go OAuth client and the MCP TypeScript SDK delivering messages to the wrong HTTP client. New cases are tracked in our AI Security hub.
Sources
NVD entry CVE-2026-115563; modelcontextprotocol/python-sdk release notes v1.30.0 and v2.2.0; python-sdk pull requests #3398, #3431 and #3435.



