Quick Take
- What: CVE-2026-76807, a DNS rebinding vulnerability in the Todoist MCP server’s optional HTTP transport (todoist-mcp-http), allowed malicious websites to invoke MCP tools using the server’s Todoist API key without authenticating the browser caller.
- Who is affected: Users running todoist-mcp-http version 10.3.2 or earlier. The stdio transport is not affected.
- CVSS score: 9.3 (Critical) in the GitHub advisory, which NVD lists; a proof of concept is public
- Fixed version: 10.3.3
- What to do: Upgrade the npm package @doist/todoist-mcp to version 10.3.3 or later.
In plain English
The Todoist MCP server is a tool that lets AI agents read and change tasks in a Todoist account. It has an optional web server mode called todoist-mcp-http that runs on your computer. Before version 10.3.3, this web server did not check whether requests came from a trusted source. A malicious website could use a trick called DNS rebinding to send commands to the server running on your own machine, even though the server was only listening on localhost.
What you should do: If you use the Todoist MCP server in HTTP mode, you should upgrade to version 10.3.3.
What happened
The Todoist MCP server provides tools that allow AI agents to access and modify a Todoist account. The optional todoist-mcp-http server, which runs on loopback (127.0.0.1) by default, accepted browser-origin requests to POST /mcp without validating the Host and Origin headers or authenticating the browser caller.
A malicious website could use DNS rebinding to route its own origin to a victim’s local 127.0.0.1 MCP server and invoke MCP tools through StreamableHTTPServerTransport. The server used the operator’s TODOIST_API_KEY to execute these tools, exposing Todoist account data and permitting operations such as task creation, updates, completion, and deletion.
The vulnerability was present in version 10.3.2 and earlier of the npm package @doist/todoist-mcp. The stdio transport, which is not browser-reachable, was not affected by this attack path.
Avishai Gonen of Pluto Security reported the issue and provided a proof of concept demonstrating how an attacker could enumerate tools, retrieve user information, create tasks, and complete tasks through DNS rebinding.
What you should do
Upgrade the npm package @doist/todoist-mcp to version 10.3.3 or later. If you run todoist-mcp-http, make sure the running server is the updated version. Users who only use the stdio transport do not need to take action, as that mode is not affected.
What it means
This vulnerability violated the browser-origin boundary. Even though the MCP server ran only on loopback, DNS rebinding allowed a public website to reach it. The server validated its own Todoist backend token but did not authenticate the browser caller or validate Host and Origin headers.
The advisory’s remediation advice is to validate the Host header against explicit loopback names, reject browser requests with a missing or untrusted Origin, and require a per-run local bearer token for HTTP mode, because Host and Origin checks alone are not caller authentication. Version 10.3.3 is the patched release. For developers building MCP servers, the lesson is that binding to 127.0.0.1 is not a security boundary against a browser. Teams that let staff run local AI tooling should prefer the stdio transport, which the advisory calls the safest default.
Local MCP servers that listen over HTTP keep running into the same problem: see our reports on the pgEdge Postgres MCP Server DNS rebinding flaw and on the Dynatrace MCP Server allowing unauthenticated tool calls in HTTP mode. New cases are tracked in our AI Security hub.
Sources
- NVD CVE-2026-76807
- GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-833v-v58w-294h



